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Our Common Cosmos: Towards a New Natural Philosophy 
 
Tom McLeish FRS, Professor of Natural Philosophy in the Department of Physics, University 
of York, York, UK, YO30 6AS 
 
Abstract 
The academic aspects of the tangled and largely misunderstood relationship between theology 
and science are themselves complicated further by the disciplinary fragmentation that has 
marked universities for the last two centuries. The apparently superficial change in usage from 
¶QDWXUDOSKLORVRSK\·WR¶VFLHQFH·LQWKHHDUO\QLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\ has disguised, yet signifies 
linguistic, metaphysical and theological moves whose consequences for academic fragmentation 
have surfaced since. In this paper we examine these through the lens of a departure from the 
nRWLRQRI¶ZLVGRP·DVDFRPSOHPHQWDU\JRRGWR¶NQRZOHGJH·:HWUDFHDSRVVLEOHUH-
constitution of a contemporary natural philosophy and its consequences for recognition of a 
common narrative of creativity in scholarship and beyond, a renewed philosophy of 
interdisciplinarity, a transformed relation of science and theology, and a route to re-establishing 
a more democratic participation in the scientific process. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The last century has increasingly UHYLVLWHGLQRQHIRUPRURWKHUWKH¶7ZR&XOWXUHV·SDUDGLJP
of the academic world [Snow 1959]. The bitter confrontation of scientist C. P. Snow (in his 
Reith lecture and subsequent book The Two Cultures) and literary scholar F.R. Leavis 
SURGXFHGXQPLVWDNDEOHHFKRHVLQWKH¶6FLHQFH:DUV·RIWKHV [Latour 2004].  In addition 
to the noisy and oppositional debates around the questions of cultural relativism, empiricism 
and scientific realism that the post-modern version of this cultural conflict prioritises, the 
tensions that they reflect have also generated more practical concerns in the shaping of 
academia.  Over the same period, the narratives around national funding strategies, have, for 
example, valorised science over the arts and humanities in its dominant research and 
educational priorities [5|UVFK 2014]. Over the same period, proponents of the arts and 
humanities have understandably perceived the need to mount explicit defences of them. Peter 
Carey, for example,  in What Good are the Arts?, writes [Carey 2006]: 
 
Literature does not make you a better person, though it may help you to criticize what you are. But 
it enlarges your mind, and it gives you thoughts, words and rhythms that will last you for a life. 
&DUH\LQDQHDUOLHUFKDSWHULQKLVSHUVRQDOVXUYH\RIWKHDUWVOHYHOVFULWLFLVPVDWWKHYLVXDO¶KLJK·
arts, especially in terms of their societal framing as, for the most part, received rather than 
actively engaged-in. There seems to be, even within the humanities themselves, further 
fragmentation resulting in a degree of academic squabbling over disciplinary priority. In similar 
YHLQ+HOHQ6PDOO·VThe Value of the Humanities develops a list of functional attributes of the 
study of the humanities, none of which attempts to engage with the sciences, but rather seeks to 
counter-balance them. It is not my purpose here to evaluate her categorisation, but note the 
significance of her final summary, referring to Bernard Williams, where she relates public value 
to private affect [Small 2013]:  
 
«ZHZLOOILQGRXUVHOYHVLQWURXEOHDVDVRFLHW\LIWKHZD\VLQZKLFKZHH[SUHVVDQGHQFRXUDJH
important values drift too far from our private sentiments and intuitions about values. 
 
These two examples also represent echoes of the Two Cultures debate. But that debacle was 
itself by no means the first confrontational articulation of a divergence between the humanities 
and the sciences, for Snow and Leavis drew heavily on an earlier debate between Matthew 
Arnold and T.H. Huxley [White 2005],  which has bequeathed a moniker to the framing of a 
discussion from which it has proven hard to break free.  
 Beyond the questions of epistemology and value, there are other less frequently 
discussed consequences of disciplinary division.  A pertinent example can be found in the 
increasingly circumscribed range of  endeavours that support a discussion of creativity.  
Paradoxically, in an age that, if media-FKDWWHUDERXW¶FUHDWLYHV·LVWREHWUXVWHGLQFUHDVLQJO\
values aptituGHIRU¶FUHDWLYLW\·WKHVDPHODWHPRGHUQSHULRGKDVZLWQHVVHGDGLVWDQFLQJRI
concepts of creativity, and of the creative link from affect to concept, from those of science 
itself. From an early-romantic visionary stance, William Wordsworth [1802] could hope that:  
 
The remotest discoveries of the Chemist, the Botanist, or Mineralogist, will be as proper objects of the 
3RHW·VDUWDVDQ\XSRQZKLFKLWFDQEHHPSOR\HGLIWKHWLPHVKRXOGHYHUFRPHZKHQWKHVHWKLQJVVKDOO
be familiar to us, and the relations under which they are contemplated by the followers of these 
respective sciences shall be manifestly and palpably material to us as enjoying and suffering beings. If 
the time should ever come when what is now called science, thus familiarized to men, shall be ready to 
put on, as it were, a form of flesh and blood, the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the 
transfiguration, and will welcome the Being thus produced, as a dear and genuine inmate of the 
household of man 
 
Later in the century, the French reaOLVWZULWHUePLOH=ROD [1964] could write of artistic 
LPDJLQDWLRQEHLQJ¶UHSODFHG·E\VFLHQWLILFPHWKRG 
 
it is experimental reasoning, which combats one by one the hypotheses of the idealists, and which 
replaces purely imaginary novels by novels of observation and experiment. 
 
Finally, at the turn of the 21st FHQWXU\WKHKROGHURI2[IRUG8QLYHUVLW\·VFKDLUIRUWKHSXEOLF
understanding of science could write [Dawkins 2006]: 
 
I don't want to decry human feelings. But let's be clear, in any particular conversation, what we are 
talking about: feelings, or truth. Both may be important, but they are not the same thing 
 
The distancing of the aesthetic, the emotional and the creative modes of human expression 
within discussion of science is a quieter, but at least as significant a change as the louder debates 
around disciplinary cultural value. Perhaps one reason for a lack of realisation that such a 
pervasive shift in the social and human framing of science has occurred since the early 19th 
century, is that the history of thought, and its disciplinary conventions within an educational 
context, has not been as deeply explored as it might. The slow divorce of the perception of 
science from both affective and creative energies has contributed to the equally strong 
UHGHILQLWLRQDOVKLIWLQWKHWHUULWRULHVRI¶VFLHQFHDQGUHOLJLRQ·>+DUULVRQ@·The medieval 
centuries, so foundational to modernism, yet without the stark divisions of humanities and 
sciences to which modernism had become so strongly wed, present themselves as potential 
sources for more fruitful reconciliation [McLeish 2016], but there are much later disciplinary 
decisions that shape the detachment of science from the humanities more generally. 
 
 
7KH0RYHIURP1DWXUDO3KLORVRSK\WR¶6FLHQFH· 
 
William Whewell coined, around 1834WKHWHUP¶VFLHQWLVW·ZKLFKJDWKHUHGFXUUHQF\ILUVWLQ
America and then Britain throughout the century.  Although Faraday and Maxwell both 
UHIXVHGWKHQHZWHUPLQVLVWLQJRQWKHROGHU¶QDWXUDOSKLORVRSKHU·WKHILQDODGRSWLRQRI
¶VFLHQWLVW·ZDVFRPSOHWHE\WKHHQGRIWKHFHQWXU\0RPHQWRXVO\WKHGLVFRYHULHVDQGWKHRULHV
RIJHRORJ\/\HOO·VJUDGXDOLVWDnd ancient formation of geological strata) and of biology 
'DUZLQ·VHYROXWLRQE\QDWXUDOVHOHFWLRQZHUHWUDQVIRUPLQJXWWHUO\WKHXQGHUVWRRGUHODWLRQVKLSV
the human race in the time and space of our world, and with the other species on earth.  
Paradoxicall\LQWKHIDFHRI:RUGVZRUWK·VYLVLRQWKHZHOO-known poet-scientist partnership of 
Coleridge and Davy [Holmes 2008] and the lucid scientific prose-development of Alexander 
von Humbold [Walls 2009], the period of romanticism swept in a fragmentation of disciplines 
DQGDIXUWKHUGLVWDQFLQJRI¶WKHLQKXPDQRWKHUQHVVRIPDWWHU· [Steiner 1989] unprecedented in 
thought. In the English-VSHDNLQJZRUOGWKHFUDFNEHWZHHQWKHOLQJXLVWLFFRQWLQHQWVRI¶VFLHQFH·
and humanities widened with respect to its cognates Wissenschaft, scienza, and sciences in 
German, Italian and French, which continued to refer to the broad sweep of academic 
µNQRZOHGJH¶ 7KHORVVRIµQDWXUDOSKLORVRSK\¶DVDQDFWLYHWHUPIRUWKRVHZKRSHUVXHG
science is arguably more than a superficial change in nomenclature, but signifies these, and 
deeper cultural shifts in late modernism. In the following we pursue three avenues that 
suggest where these underlying shifts might find their loci. 
 
2.(a) Linguistics and Etymology 
The change in nomenclature ² ¶QDWXUDOSKLORVRSK\·EHFRPHV¶VFLHQFH·, and their cognates 
mutatis mutandis ² carries with it many etymological undercurrents of meaning.  A Greek 
GHFODUDWLRQRI¶ORYHRIZLVGRPRIQDWXUDOWKLQJV·philo ² Sophia) is slowly replaced by a 
Latinate claim to knowledge (scio:RUGVZRUWK·Vfar more critical appraisal of science than in 
the Lyrical Ballads, ¶we murder to dissect·XVHVWKHWHUP¶VFLHQFH·ZKHUH.HDWVDQG3RH
UHWDLQHG¶SKLORVRSK\· 
 The language-worlds change. The more contemplative scholarship that Greek 
provenance suggests, together with its allusions to wisdom, rather than knowledge, and to love, 
rather than to control, is replaced by the Latin of the conquering power of mid and late 
DQWLTXLW\/DWHQWLQ)UDQFLV%DFRQ·VQDUUDWLYHRIDPDVWHU\RIQDWXUHZLWKLWVRZQLQYDVLYHDQG
even violent language, the term ¶VFLHQFH·KDVDresonance with domination, albeit through 
knowledge rather than explicit violence, that had been implied from the early 16th century.  
Knowledge commands an alternative and less-commented aspect ² that of a game. No less a 
ORVVRIZLVGRPWKHVXSHUILFLDOO\SOD\IXOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH¶NQRZOHGJHJDPH·LVLQIDQWLOLVLQJ
in Bacon [1887]: 
 
The glory of God is to conceal a thing, but the glory of the king is to nd it out; as if, according to the 
innocent play of children, the Divine Majesty took delight to hide his works, to the end to have them 
found out; and as if kings could QRWREWDLQDJUHDWHUKRQRXUWKDQWREH*RG·VSOD\IHOORZVLQWKDW
game, considering the great commandment of wits and means, whereby nothing needeth to be hidden 
from them.  
 
The latent metaphysical shift is released in the early 19th century through a change in language, 
that both expresses the dynamic of a loss of wisdom and participates in it. 
 
2.(b) Metaphysics and Affect 
The first metaphysical consequence of the shift from natural philosophy to science is, 
paradoxically, the loss of metaphysics itself from scientific discourse. As Nicholas Maxwell has 
XUJHG>0D[ZHOO@WKHGLYRUFHRISKLORVRSK\IURPVFLHQFHLVQ·WUHDOO\SRVVLEOH² all science 
requires a metaphysical framework of assumptions of domain and methodology. If not 
explicitly acknowledged then the current set of assumptions become implicit and invisible, but 
not inoperative.          
 To take one example that has enjoyed an interesting resurgence recently, a generation 
ago the tacit assumption that science was built upon a necessary and strong ontological 
reductionism was near-XELTXLWRXV7KH¶LQSULQFLSOH·GHWHUPLQLVPRIWKHVWUXFWXUHDQG
behaviour of large-scale assemblies of complex matter from the complete causal set of 
microscopic degrees of freedom, and the resulWDQW¶FDXVDOFRPSOHWHQHVVRISK\VLFV·&&3KDV
been claimed as necessary for the function of scientific method itself [Humphries 2016]. One 
consequence of the strong reductionist assumption has been the generation of the fraught and 
problematic debate witKLQWKH¶WKHRU\RIPLQG·[Lowe 2010]. A more recent discussion, 
however, itself emerging from a renewed collaboration between physicists and philosophers, 
has reappraised the necessity of reduction in all causal variables to an empirical one. Much 
simpler systems than mind, operating in both classical and quantum domains, possess 
VWUXFWXUHVWKDWSUHVHQWFDQGLGDWHVIRUD¶VWURQJHPHUJHQFH·LQFOXGLQJVHWVRIORQJ-range 
variables inherently non-reducible to atomistic (or smaller-scale) variables, yet determining of 
the future evolution of the systems [McLeish, Pexton and Lancaster 2019]. 
 However, the etymological shift from natural philosophy to science does more than 
demote metaphysics.  0D[ZHOO·VWKHVLVWKDWWKHUHFRYHU\RID¶QDWXUDOSKLORVRSK\·IRUWRGD\
amounts purely to a reconnection of the scientific disciplines with philosophy itself surely falls 
short of its full implications. There is more than the recovery of metaphysics to be discovered 
in a deeper excavation of the history of a natural philosophy7KH¶ORYH·ZLWKLQphilosophia 
might remind us that  the contemplative practice of earlier ages had not made a second artificial 
divide as we late moderns have: that between cognition and affect. $VXVWDLQHG¶QDWXUDO
SKLORVRSK\·ZRXOGQRWKDYHVXSSRUWHGWhe loss of a conscious role for the affective in the 
practice of science, addressing the move traced in the previous section from Wordsworth to 
Zola and Dawkins.  Philosophy does more than erect a meta-logical canopy over the practice of 
science, it releases a fuller engagement of the human mind, including the emotional faculties, 
within it. David Hume articulates this best of the early ² moderns [Hume 2007 p.35]: 
 
The difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the 
latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure. It 
must be excited by nature, like all other sentiments; and must arise from the particular situation, in 
which the mind is placed at any particular juncture  
 
In his earlier Treatise on Human Understanding, Hume is even stronger on a deception of 
enlightenment rationality ² that the emotions play no part in the philosophical search for truth: 
 
%\UHDVRQZHPHDQDIIHFWLRQV«EXWVXFKDVRSHUDWHPRUHFDOPly, and cause no disorder in the 
temper: Which tranquility leads us into a mistake concerning them, and causes us to regard them as 
FRQFOXVLRQVRQO\RIRXULQWHOOHFWXDOIDFXOWLHVµ 
 
The essential and explicit role of the affective as well as, and in partnership with, the cognitive 
faculties, is one that marked discourse and writing in natural philosophy before its restriction to 
¶VFLHQFH·>0F/HLVK@ 
 
2.(c) Theological and Philosophical Perspectives from Medieval to Modern 
 
The 13th. century English polymath Robert Grosseteste prefaces the body of his published work 
on natural philosophy and scientific topics with a remarkable treatise on the seven liberal arts. 
Written probably in the period 1200-1215, it begins with the summary of high medieval 
philosophy of education. The deliberate discussion of the integrated nature and purpose of the 
disciplines in that age might, in the fragmented academic world of our own, offer a helpful 
reflection on the late modern issues that follow from a lRVVRI¶QDWXUDOSKLORVRSK\·>*URVVHWHVWH
2019 (1215)]. Grosseteste begins: 
 
Now, there are seven arts that purge human works of error and lead them to perfection. These are 
the only parts of philosophy that are given the name 'art', because it is their effect alone to lead 
human operations towards perfection through correction. The works within our capacity consist either 
in the mind's sight, or in the desire of the same, or in bodily movements, or in the dispositions of these 
same movements. Sight first looks; then it verifies what has been looked at or cognised, and when the 
fitting or harmful things have been verified within the mind or within sight, desire covets to embrace 
the fitting, or retreats into itself to shun the harmful. 
Several surprising and strange notions surface simultaneously for a modern reader of this dense 
passage, as in the entire treatise that follows.  
First, the arts (which here include the sciences of course), for Grosseteste, do not 
primarily support vocation or equip for employment, but constitute personal virtues that 
underpin them. Their PRUDOUHODWLRQVKLSVWR¶the good· on the one hand, and ¶the harmful· on 
the other, illustrate this unfamiliar framing. The surprise for modern sensibility increases when 
it becomes clear that thHWUHDWLVH·VHWKLFDOGHYHORSPHQWDQGRULHQWDWLRQVSHQGVUHODWLYHO\OLWWOH
time on the lettered arts of the trivium (grammar, logic and rhetoric); rather its bulk is devoted 
to the mathematical arts of the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music), 
especially the last two. 
Second, the consequence of a proper grasp and deployment of the arts is not so much 
the application of knowledge, as a holistic ordering of the human in operation and behaviour. 
Furthermore, the process is not one of mind-directed activity, but derives from a vision of 
LQWHUFRQQHFWLRQRI¶VLJKW·¶GHVLUH·DQG¶ERGLO\PRYHPHQW· or as we might articulate  it, from 
¶WKRXJKW·WR¶DFWLRQ·  
Third, it is the interplay and dynamic of these three functions that achieves the fruitful 
rather than the harmful. The pursuit of disciplines is a moral and ethical activity, but also an 
explicitly practical one. For Grosseteste personally, the context this work enjoys within his 
corpus is highly significant. Though dating of his treatises is notoriously difficult, in this case 
there is strong support for the conclusion that this survey of the liberal arts acts as a preface to 
his significant body of work on natural philosophy. That this contains a wealth of highly novel 
and imaginative proposals on the qualities and behaviour of light and colour [Dinkova-Bruun 
et al. (2013)], sound and matter points to the aspect creative fruitfulness inherent to his 
GHILQLWLRQRI¶WKHJRRG·LQUHVSHFWRIOHDUQLQJ 
Fourth, the spectrum of disciplines is highly integrated in any account of praxis. The 
subsequent treatise details the ways in which virtuous human beings adopt the learning of 
geometry as much as logic, of astronomy as much as rhetoric, to order their worlds fruitfully.  
The way in which the liberal arts work out within this scheme is alluded to and anticipated in 
the introductory passage above in an account of what we might now refer to as a psychological 
SURFHVV¶6LJKWDWILUVWORRNV«·LVWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIDQDFFRXQWRIH[SHULHQFH7KLV¶VLJKW·LV
not necessarily visual ² here the Latin aspectus is invoked in its fully metaphorical sense of 
PHQWDOVLJKWRUYLVLRQ6LPLODUO\¶GHVLUH·LVWKHFRPSOHPHQWDU\affectus HOLFLWHGE\WKHPLQG·V
cognition, but necessary to drive both further thought and subsequent action. We talk loosely 
WRGD\RIDFWLQJIURPRXU¶KHDG·RURXU¶KHDUW·DV if these were exclusive modes of motivation.  
But for a medieval thinker, the emotions and rationality were intrinsically intertwined.  In many 
ways we are less subtle now, needing rather nuanced definitions of these two Latin terms: 
 
 Affectus comprises the will, desire, or divine speculation.  It has a greater projection onto the 
emotional than does aspectus, and less onto the cognitive or rational.  It is the immediate motivator of 
motion or action. It responds more to the internal than the external, but can be directed by aspectus.  
Aspectus is intellectual apprehension. It has a greater projection onto the cognitive and 
UDWLRQDODQGOHVVRQWRZKDWZHZRXOGWHUPWKH¶HPRWLRQDO·WRGD\,WDFWVRQDIIHFWXVUDWKHUWKDQ
acted on by it. It possesses a senVHRILQQHUSHUFHSWLRQJHQWO\LQYRNLQJWKHYLVXDO¶DVSHFW·RIFRJQLWLRQ 
 
The two notions map approximately onto our language of cognition and emotion, but these are 
only the dominant components of their content. There is a palpable admixture of the affective 
LQ¶DVSHFWXV·DVPXFKRIWKHUDWLRQDOO\H[HFXWHGLQWKH¶DIIHFWXV·,IQRWKLQJHOVHWKLVVKRXOG
warn us that any apparently clear distinction between the emotional and cognitive today is the 
result of as much cultural circumstance as it is psychological structure. 'DYLG+XPH·V
observations and warnings echoed deeply reflective medieval antecedants. 
The remarkable claim of Grosseteste and Hume alike is for a centrality of passion in 
the acquisition of scientific knowledge itself, not purely in the aesthetic enjoyment of its fruits. 
Yet it is a truth, if a suppressed one, that all scientists know.  Furthermore, it presents an 
important diversity within affect: as well as the violent passions of joy and grief, there are the 
quieter ones that may even, for their persistent nature, be mistaken for the rational (aspectus).  
$VDOLHQWH[DPSOHZRXOGEHWKH¶DHVWKHWLFHPRWLRQ·² the appreciation of beauty, which threads 
its way through the testimonies of both artistic and scientific creation, both as motivation and 
response. Keeping alert to such quieter emotions is important in gathering personal evidence 
on the creative phase of science, but doing so is to swim against the tide of current scientific 
narrative.  If Hume was able to report, and even to analyse, the emotional thread of natural 
philosophy without controversy, it was because science was as honest about its passions in the 
eighteenth century as it was in the thirteenth.  
A further function of emotional affect emerges when its entanglement with the cognitive 
is set within the context of creativity. That affect and cognition support a mutual collaboration 
in the search for innovation, the creative solution, the imagining of the new was the contention 
of French mathematician and mathematical physicist HeQUL3RLQFDUp >3RLQFDUp@. Faced 
ZLWKWKHXQLYHUVDOH[SHULHQFHLQZKLFKWKHPDWKHPDWLFLDQ·VFRQVFLRXVPLQGLVVXGGHQO\
presented with a clear perception of a pathway to the solution of a mathematical problem, he 
realises that the non-conscious mind has been at work during periods of apparent respite from 
conscious labour upon it.  He also calculates that a purely unguided, mechanical function of 
checking possibilities is not a candidate for the way this subconscious process works: there are 
simply too many possible avenues within the space of candidate proofs for each to be checked 
exhaustively: 
 
What is the cause then, among the thousand products of our unconscious activity, some are called to 
pass the threshold, while others remain below? Is it a simple chance which confers this privilege? 
Evidently not; among all the stimuli of our senses, for example, only the most intense x our 
attention, unless it has been drawn to them by other causes. More generally the privileged unconscious 
phenomena, those susceptible of becoming conscious, are those which, directly or indirectly, a ect most 
profoundly our emotional sensibility.  
3RLQFDUpFRQFOXGHVWKDWWKHUHDUHKLGGHQDHVWKHWLFDQGDIIHFWLYHIXQFWLRQVWKDWJXLGHWKHQRQ-
conscious mind towards sub-spaces of fruitful ideas. He might have been developing a direct 
application by example from the medieval analysis of  mental sight and affect.  
The theological tradition which provides the context of the balance between affect and 
cognition, and especially its moral framing, is that of wisdom. Here is another theological 
UHVRQDQFH¶QDWXUDOSKLORsophy·WKDWLVODUJHO\PLVVHGLQFRQWHPSRUDry discourse. Yet not 
entirely so - Mathematician Ennio De Giorgi spoke at a 1996 congress of philosophers, 
scientists and theologians gathered to reflect on the theme of wonder in the natural sciences, of 
another ancient wisdom-book [Bowden 2009]:  
 
A reminder of the oldest roots of wisdom might seem out of place as an answer to the problems posed 
by the developments of science and modern technology, but I believe that if we want, if not to resolve 
such problems, at least to take a correct approach to them, we must put them in a very broad 
perspective which embraces the most concrete and lowliest realities we well as the highest and most 
abstract ones. It seems to me that this perspective is that of the book of Proverbs, which speaks at 
length of the most common human conditions and finally of the life of the smallest and most common 
animals, and in which Wisdom herself says of herself that she was with the Lord at the beginning, 
before the creation of the world, which delighted in this creation and loves to stand with the sons of 
men (cf. Prov 8:22-31) 
 
7KHSDVVDJH'L*LRUJLTXRWHVLVDGHOLJKWIXOGHVFULSWLRQRI¶:LVGRP·Sophia in Greek, 
hokhma in Hebrew) as a little girl playing within the early epochs of the created world, as its 
order emerges in the form of land and sea, the depths and the heavens. The poem describes a 
wisdom that blends a deep contemplation of the natural world with a practical engagement. In a 
fascinating development that describes the experience of multiple perspectives in scientific and 
artistic negotiation of subject and object, Di Giorgi brings left- and right-hemisphere 
perspectives into focus when he describes the consequence of wisdom in science [Bowden 
2009]: 
 
The humility and commitment to daily work must be combined with an attitude of respect and 
attention to every branch of knowledge since in life everyone succeeds in informing themselves only on a 
limited number of subjects, but can and must love all of wisdom in the broadest sense of the word. 
 
(PEHGGHGLQ'L*LRUJL·VZRUGV but also echoing through the longer comparative stories of 
creativity in picture, word and number, is also solid practical advice. Little of the radically new 
emerges from a narrow obsession or labour within established boundaries. There is value in 
broad¶LQWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\·H[FXUVLRQVQRWRQO\IRUWKHLURZQVDNHRUIRUWKHEHQHILWRI
recuperation, valuable though these are, but for the new patterns and connections that they 
offer for specific creative demands. Although the most distant connections require the deepest 
and longest incubation, even at the still-mysterious depths of the non-conscious, the long wait 
for their surfacing is worth the patience.  For an early-modern articulation of the same vision 
ZHFDQWXUQWR1HZWRQ·VFRQWHPSRUDU\PDWKHPDWLFian and theologian Isaac Barrow, who 
wrote: 
 
He can hardly be a good scholar who is not a general one, for one part of learning doth confer light 
XSRQDQRWKHU· 
 
The Book of Job has been a constant inspiration for thinkers of all traditions and in all 
centuries. Contemporary neo-Kantian philosopher Susan Neiman has recently even urged that 
Job be held alongside Plato as a foundational text for western thought [Neiman 2016].  Here 
Neiman sums up the tension between order and chaos in both the natural and moral worlds of 
Job: 
 
As Kant would later put it, two things fill the mind with awe and wonder the more often and more 
steadily we look upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. They are 
both awesome and wonderful, but entirely separate - the one stands for a cosmos described by the 
Voice from the Whirlwind, a cosmos so vast and impersonal that it strikes down our self-conceit and 
makes us feel, as Job put it, that we are but dust. Yet the moral law within me, which Job so 
beautifully upholds in his darkest hours ² he may wish he had never been born, but he never once 
wishes he had behaved anything less than righteously ² that moral law reveals our power to step in 
and change a piece of the world if it seems to be gone wrong 
 
The Book of Job, of all ancient literature, succeeds in articulating in timeless and plangent 
depth the difference between what human beings consider the world ought to be, and how they 
find it. Its response, in poetic dialogue of beautifully structured form, but of brutally honest 
content, has also shocked and offended many of its readers. One of its enduring puzzles is that, 
when God finally answers long-VXIIHULQJ\HWULJKWHRXV-RE·VFRPSODLQWV¶IURPWKHZKLUOZLQG·KLV
Answer seems to by-pass the moral dimensLRQVRI-RE·VSUHGLFDPHQWGLUHFWLQJKLPLQVWHDG
with over 160 questions about the natural world. This extraordinary and influential text suggests 
WKDWWKHDQVZHUWRRQHRIKXPDQLW\·VPRVWVHYHUHDQGUXQQLQJPRUDOSUREOHPVLVWREHIRXQGLQ
a theological natural philosophy.  The encounter with aleatoric nature in this questioning and 
searching mode is, for Job, therapeutic. Perhaps this is the guiding narrative which brought in 
the great 20th century double Nobel laureate Marie SkÏodowska-Curie to declare [quoted in 
Benard 1973 p. v]: 
 
Nothing in life is to be feared, it is only to be understood. Now is the time to understand more, so 
that we may fear less.  
 
A long tradition within the same worldview that encompasses the wisdom texts of Job 
and Proverbs is that, in some sense, humankind is created in Imago Dei ² in the image of God 
² an idea whose hermeneutics have spawned an extensive literature, but which surely captures 
at its heart the fundamental urge and ability to create. Contemporary theologian Philip Hefner 
has developed DWKHRORJ\RI¶FR-FUHDWLRQ·IURPWKLVVWDUWLQJSRLQW addressing the challenges of 
EHLQJ¶FLWL]HQVLQWKHFRPPRQZHDOWKRIWKHQDWXUDOZRUOG· [Hefner 1993]. The human ability to  
co-create lies, for Hefner, at the nexus of the evolving freedom of the world. The act is 
simultaneously constrained, or conditioned, by the past but embodies freedom to explore 
potential in the future. Creation assumes the moral value of choice in doing so. Hefner has a 
late-modern take on the disjointed relationship of humankind with the world, pointing out the 
dangers of a runaway technology of our own making that we are no longer able to control. 
The story of a creator out of control of creation transports the discussion back once 
more to Job, for the hymn to wisdom and the voice from the whirlwind hold the balance of 
FKDRVDQGRUGHULQFRQVWDQWWHQVLRQ7KH%RRNRI-RE·VFRQWH[WRISDLQDQGWKHVKRFNLQJ
implication from both of its great poems that humans may share in the perceptive and 
imaginative vision of God, hints at another aspect to Imago Dei ² that we share not only the 
ability to create but also a related propensity to suffer. The pain of separation, of disjointedness 
ZLWKWKHZRUOGLVWKHLPSRUWRI-RE·VDQJXLVK7KHLPPHUVLQJ² one might say incarnational - 
experience of questioning engagement with nature that Job experiences in the whirlwind is by 
no means the end of his healing, but does signal its beginning.  
Surprisingly, the theological lens through which the reflective thinkers of the 12th and 
13th centuries looked on the questions of human predicament, creativity and purpose, projects 
those insights forward into our own age, resonating with searching philosophies of affect, while 
at the same time drawing on much older traditions of wisdom. It is no coincidence that 
¶ZLVGRP·DSSHDUVH[SOLFLWO\LQWKHROGHUQDPHVIRUVFLHQFH² ¶QDWXUDOSKLORVRSK\·GHFODUHVLWV
love of wisdom, as we have noted, so that even secular thinking in universities today may 
legitimately draw on the reception of wisdom-tradition and the reflection on human teleology 
that a theological framing supplies. 
 
 
3. Conclusions: $1DWXUDO3KLORVRSK\IRU7RGD\·V8QLYHUVLWLHV 
I have urged in this paper a broader interpretation than, for example Maxwell [2012] of a 
renewed conception of natural philosophy within a contemporary academia and its public 
context. Within its own long history of thought and contemplation, drawing on tributaries from 
the ancient world, and from medieval thought, it offers much more than a philosophical 
framing and underpinning of science. Even this brief investigation has also been able to identify 
other implicit themes: a renewed account of creativity, an appreciation of the involvement of 
the human totality of affect and cognition in discovery and scholarship, an account of purpose, 
and an approach to the interdisciplinary unity of knowledge that retains an appreciation of 
disciplinary distinctness and power while providing narrative and methodological resources to 
erode the current barriers between them. 
 David Lowenthal [2019] has (posthumously) warned against a QDwYe TXHVWIRUWKH¶XQLW\
RINQRZOHGJH·+HUHPLQGVXVWKDWWKLQNHUVIURP*DPEDWWLVWD9Lco to Isaiah Berlin have 
claimed an incommensurability between the inner world of intention and value, and the outer 
cosmos of discernible physical law. Yet both the ancient wisdom of The Book of Job, and the 
modern insights into the multiple mutual couplings and connections between the human and 
the material declare this boundary to be more porous that this modern tradition claims. Physics 
indicates that the screen between observer and observed is an illusory one. Geography and 
Earth Sciences provides us with the new realisation that the ancient wisdom that human 
behaviour has natural consequences, for good or for ill, applies. Neuroscience embeds our very 
thoughts, emotions and intentions into the matrix of the material, yet in the same stroke allows 
the attribution of emergent intentionality to matter. 
 +LVWRULDQ0LFKDHO6DGOLHUDQG/RZHQWKDOVXJJHVWWKDW¶VWRU\KDVEHFRPHWKHPDVWHU
PHWDSKRUIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJHYHU\WKLQJ«DQGWKXVIRUXQLWLQJWKHWZRFXOWXUHVWKHDUWVDQG
WKHVFLHQFHV·>TXRWHGLQ/RZenthal 2019, p. 195]. The blurring narratives of the sciences of 
matter, earth and mind are themselves examples of scientific stories that require humanistic 
framing to cohere. But perhaps the most fundamental shared narrative of all is the repeated 
story of the creative process itself, which threads through all scientific and artistic endeavour 
[McLeish 2019]. Telling each other our stories of vision for what might be but is not yet, 
whether this is the scientific understanding of  a new field of nature or a work of art, searching 
for it within the debilitating constraints of our own misconceptions, ignorance and inabilities, 
conceiving of a new and fruitful approach, the long labour to its realisation ² this is one of the 
great narrative plots of human experience. A natural philosophical approach to the sciences 
would recognise, rehearse and affirm the narrative experiences of research. As all narratives, it 
would value and vindicate the role of affective faculties alongside the cognitive in creation. 
 The high valency of the natural philosophy I have discussed would allow it to endow 
the sciences with resources that complete and connect across a much more united disciplinary 
landscape of academia. In addition to its natural narrative awareness, its theological and 
philosophical priors permit the richer discussion of teleology than an isolated faculty of science 
is able to do. This may draws on theological material, and I have claimed that even a through-
going secular framework would legitimately do so. But it is equally possible to cast discussion of 
purpose in an anthropological setting [McLeish 2016].  Alister McGrath has recently proposed 
an alternative approach that takes the model of a developed interdisciplinary discourse between 
science and theology as DSDWWHUQRID¶PHWD-UDWLRQDOLW\·RIPXOWLSOH¶WHUULWRULHV·RIHSLVWHPRORJ\
WKDW\HWVXSSRUWVDZRUOGRI¶RQWRORJLFDOXQLW\·>0F*UDWK@7HOOLQJO\0F*UDWKVXVSHFWV
that we will need to drop some of the assumptions of Enlightenment rationality to do so. As we 
have seen, it is precisely the concurrent early modern divisions of knowledge and wisdom, of 
cognition and affect, of the inner human and external material worlds ² the sleight of hand that 
replaced these palpable dualities with enlightenment dualism ² that need to be reconnected 
before a natural philosophy may flourish. But when it does it will embody the re-attachment of 
knowledge to both wisdom and love that its name signifies. 
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